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Since the closing of the frontier , in the last quarter of the 19th century, the
encounter with an increasingly dominant urban-industrial society has emerged
as the maior force in American agricultural development. The dramatic impact
of this encounter during the last two decades has contributed to a crisis in social
organization in both urban and rural areas. This crisis has resulted in an intensity
of concern by farmers, and of farm organizations, with agriculture’s changing
role in the national economy that has turned the question of “bargaining power
for farmers” into one of the leading issues in current agricultural policy discussion.
The mi Ik holding action by the National Farmers Organization (NFO) in
March 1967 dramatized, to both the general public and to the .nationul political
leadership, the seriousness of the efforts which some farmers were wi Iling to make
in order to achieve greater “bargaining power in the market place. ”
In response to this new evidence of “rural unrest” Secretary of Agriculture Freeman
took to the country for a series of “shirt sleeve” conferences with largely hosti Ie
farm audiences across the Midwest. Task force studies and meetings with farm
producers and marketing organizations to explore the interest and economic
consequences of strengthening the powerof farmers to bargain about terms of sale
and market prices were conducted by the Department of Agriculture during the
fall of 1967. In his January 1968 State of the Union Message and in his
Agricu Itural Message on February 27, President Johnson recommended that
Congress give serious attention to legislation “to help farmers bargain more
effectively for fair prices. “
In February 1968 Senator Mondale of Minnesota introduced legislation that wou Id
amend the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 to (a) extend the collective
bargaining procedures avai Iable under marketing order arrangements to a larger
* Based on a paper presented at a hearing befcre the U, S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture ad Forestry, Washington, D, C. , April 10, 1968.
** I am indebted to Frank Smith of the University of Minnesota, Department of
Agricultural Economics , and to George Donohue of the University of Minnesota,
Department of Sociology, for comments and criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.-2-
number of commodities (Title 11), (b) establish a National Agricultural Relations
Board to supervise bargaining between farmer marketing and purchasing committees
(Title i), and (c) provide greater protection to farmers against coercion or dis-
crimination by handlers or processors because of membership in a bargaining
association (Title 11[). The objectives of Title ill have essentially been achieved
through the recent passage of the Agricu Itural Fair Practices Act.
The issue of bargaining power for farmers is not new in the history of agricultural
policy discussion. Farmers have long used organization as a means of improving
their political and economic bargaining power, The National Grange, oldest
of U. S. farm organizations (1867) , grew rapidly in response to the long period
of rural distress in the 1870’s. The Farmers Alliance Movement in the 1880’s
represented a second maior attempt by farmers to organize themselves. This
effort led to the formation of the Populist Party in 1891. The Farmers Union,
organized in 1902, drew heavily on the old Farmers Alliance-Populist movement
for its leadership and support. In contrast to earlier political efforts, however,
the Farmers Union placed maior emphasis on achieving economic power through
cooperative marketing.
The most dramatic effort by farmers to achieve direct marketing power occurred
during the 1920’s. Farmer cooperative associations achieved protection from
antitrust action through the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) and the Capper-
Volstead Act (1922). Under the Ieademhip of Aaron Sapiro of California,
national commodity cooperatives for wheat, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and many
other crops were formed. The obiective of organization was to obtain control
over a sufficient proportion of the entire crop to become a dominant factor in
the market. Control of producer deliveries were to be achieved by means of
Iongterm contracts with members.
The success of the “monopoly cooperative model” Sapiro movement fell far short
of its hopes. It failed primari Iy because its organizers had underestimated the
economic power necessary to withhold supplies of maior agricultural commodities
from the market in order to achieve price enhancement.
With failure of the market power movement of the 1920’s, the maior thrust of
agricultural policy from the 1930’s tQ the mid-1960’s has been the use of
political power to achieve economic gains. This political power, made effective
through the organization of the “Farm Bloc “ in Congress ~ has been focused
primari Iy on the achievement of favorable prices for farm commodities through
the use of production contro I and surplus disposal programs. These programs
have employed land use controls to regu late agricultural production and the power
of the Federal budget to ho Id price depressing “surplus commodities” off the market
or to dispose of them through “noncompetitive” markets—through domestic “food
stamp” and international food aid programsl for example. In recent years, however,-3-
the Farm Bloc has tended to disintegrate. As even favorable farm legislation,
such as the Agricu Itural Act of 1965, has fai led to provide the price enhancement
and income goals which many farmers regard as reasonable, a new interest in the
achievement of economic objectives through direct “bargaining power in the market
place” has emerged.
In my opinion the source of rural unrest today reflects more than a simple concern
over farm prices and incomes. It stems from a pervasive uneasiness about the
future of agriculture, and of rural life, in an urban-industrial society. This concern
has lead to a iudgment by many farmers and farm leaders that the use of political
power to influence government programs to achieve substantial economic gains is
no longer effective. Market power is regarded as a patential alternative to political
power. The implication of this iudgment, to many farmers, is that they must attempt
to design a system which places farm leaden in a position of economic power—in a
position to affect economic decisions in the private sector—iust as they have used
political power to place themselves in a position to affect economic decisions in the
Public sector durinu the last three decades.
Although this iudgment is most intense in the traditional Populist states of the
Upper Midwest , it is held to a substantial degree by farmers and by farm organization
leaders throughout the nation. Neither is it confined to a limited income or economic
class within the broad spectrum that might be labeled “commercial agricu !ture. ” Indeed,
this iudgment is probably most intense among many of the more aggressive young farmers
who have committed themselves to commercial agriculture and have gone into debt to
acquire the land, equipment , and other assets necessary to organize a viable commercial
enterprise.
Behind this iudgment is a “conspiratorial” view of the role of economic power in American
economic organization that has much in common with the Populist roots of the current
rural unrest. According to this view, farmers are weak and unorganized. The rest of
the economy— both business and labor— is highly organized and capable of exercising
monopoly power in labor and product markets. Consumer interests are viewed as
exercising increasing power in favor of “cheap food” policies in the Executive Office
of the Presidentl the Department of Agriculture and the Congress. Farmers are, in
this view, the powerless victims of exploitation since they represent the only sector
of the economy left to the free play of competitive forces.
There are two possible conclusions from such an analysis. The first is that the
labor and industrial “monopolies” should be broken up. This was the route
chosen by the agrarian Popu lists when they supported the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (1890) and other antimonopoly legislation. The antimonopoly approach
is no longer viewed as holding any prospect for substantial economic gains by
farmers. The laws to promote free markets which were supported by the early
Populists were passed, yet the problem of declining farm numbers and low-4-
,
farm incomes remains.
the only alternative is
Given the view of economic society held by farm leaders,
to organize farmers to achieve the economic power to
“bargain” direct[y in the market place for more favorable conditions of sale and
for higher farm prices.
The National Farmers Organization, formed in 1955, represents the most articulate
exponent of collective bargaining for agriculture. Its initial approach was
clearly developed with the “labor union model” in mind. Formal affiliation
with the labor movement was reiected after considerable controversy within
the organization during its initial years, primari Iy on the grounds that associ-
ation with organized labor wou Id be regarded with mistrust by many farmers.
By 1959 the NFO was sufficiently well organized to attempt a limited or “test”
livestock holdlng action in several areas in Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska.
Further limited holding actions were held over somewhat larger areas in 1960
and in 1961. These test actions were followed by an all-out effort to hold live-
stock off the market in the fall of 1962. This action generated considerable
tension among farmers over the NFO approach and occasional outright violence
against livestock truckers and in several livestock markets. Although the holding
action had little economic impact, it represented an important step in the NFO
campaign to expand its membership.
The second maior action by the NFO was the 1967 milk holding action. This
effort clearly was more carefully organized than the earlier actions. Preliminary
results of a study now being completed at the University of Minnesota indicate
that substantial quantities of mi Ik were held off the market during the two weeks
when the action was most effective. The effect of this action was felt primarily
in the production of manufactured dairy products such as butter and cheese
rather than in the consumption of fluid milk.
It is sti II too early to evaluate the effects of the current “al I commodity” holding
action. This action is being implemented in a series of steps. A grain holding
action was announced in January. Meat was added in February. A new milk
holding action is tentatively scheduled later this spring. According to the
NFO Reporter, “The strategy . . . is to build a climax of effect on all agricultural
commodities at about the same time. . . to shut down the agricultural plant. . .
unti I contracts and the desired prices are achieved by NF-O. ” Along with the
holding action, the NFO is urging farmers to take fu II advantage of the USDA
farm programs to hold commodities off the market and reduce next year’s pro-
duction. It seems apparent that this new “al I commodity” action represents part
of an election year strategy to maintain a mi Iitant membership in order to
demonstrate effective pa Iitica I power. If effective, it should also “soften up”
processor opposition and contribute to “membership expansion.-5-
Theappeal of the “bargainingpower’’approach has notgone unnoticed by other
farm organizations. The American Farm Bureau Federation has establishedan
affiliate, the American Agricultural Marketing Association (AAMA), to bargain
with processors. Although some NFOspeakers have characterized the Farm
Bureau effort asa “companyunion” approach—urging the processors to sign
with the Farm Bureau so they would not have to deal with the NFO—the Farm
Bureau bargaining groups have experienced some success. In Ohio and Indiana
the association has been effective in raising the general level of raw tomato
prices.
The Farmers Union, while adopting a certain amount of the “bargaining power”
terminology, continues to emphasize the need for supply control by the Federal
government. According to Director of Legislative Services for the Farmers
Union, “1 cannot conceive of farm bargaining being effective without supply
control on a nationwide basis on commodities produced widely in the nation.
With sufficient ‘teeth’ in the supply control provisions, I see no reason why
market bargaining cannot be effectively applied to the maior commodities and
bring about farm income improvement. ”
The Farmers Union position poses the fundamental economic question that wil I
determine whether the current drive to achieve greater bargaining power by
farmers will survive or whether it will end up in the same political and economic
bankruptcy as the “Sapitm movement” of the 1920’s. The NFO has placed maior
emphasis on price enhancement as the single ob!ective of its organizing effort.
It seems reasonable to ask what conditions must be met to create an economic
environment for successfu I price enhancement through collective bargaining
between farmers and marketing firms.
Whether the purpose of bargaining is to increase wages in industry or to raise
the prices of farm products, two conditions must be met:
First, the bargaining group must represent a large enough fraction of workers
&%rmers to win recognition from employers or buyers.
Second, if a bargain with a particular firm , industry, or commodity market
raises wages or prices, additional workers and other resources wi II be attracted
and production wi II expand unless some way can be found to insu late the firm,
industry, or commodity sector from normal market processes.
The second condition is particu Iarly difficu It to achieve without assistance from
the government. It involves rationing access to the higher priced labor or
commodity markets. This may be done through seniority rights, quota al locations,
and other devices. One result of such restrictions is unemployed labor in industry
and idle land in agricu Iture. If unemployment of labor or other resources is to be
avoided, someone — usual Iy the government— must act as the employer of last-6-
resort or stand ready to purchase and dispose of the excess production.
If these conditions are to be met, it wi II require a greater degree of organization,
cohesion, and control over production and marketing than farmers and ranchers
have traditional Iy been wi IIing to i repose on themselves. The reason they have
not been wi Iling to proceed as far in this direction as industrial workers is not
due to a weakness of moral fiber among farmers. It stems, to some degree, from
the fact that laws supporting collective bargaining in agricu Itural markets have
been less adequate than the laws that support co Ilective bargaining in labor
markets.
A more fundamental I set of limitations stems from the dramatic changes in the
market for agricultural products and in the technology of agricultural production
which have occurred in this country since World War II.
First, food consumption in the United States is, with the minor exception of a
~exotic commodities, no longer very responsive to changes in prices or
incomes. This means that lower prices do not significantly expand total pruchases
of agricultural commodities. Simi Iarly, higher prices do not significantly reduce
total purchases. This is not true of individual commodities, however. Consumers
do respond to changes in the price of butter relative to the price of margarine
or of poultry relative to the price of pork. This tendency sets limits to the power
of any one commodity group to raise its price,
Second, the rate of technical progress in agriculture is more rapid than the
growth of demand for farm products. Labor productivity has been expanding
at a rate of more than 6 percent per year and the demand for food at less than
2 percent per year. This means that roughly 4 percent of the labor force in
agriculture becomes redundant each year, With excess capacity to produce in
agriculture, farmers are extremely aggressive in expanding the production, of any
commodity which promises favorable returns.
The low elasticity of demand for farm products, in total, holds out the promise
of substantial gains from price enhancement through collective bargaining. The
rapid production response to changes in the relative prices of individual farm
commodities, permitted by modern technology, erodes these potential gains
before they can be realized by more than a limited number of farmers.
The biological nature of agricultural production processes also i reposes a
heavy burden on the bargaining process. Labor time lost during a strike
does not contribute to increased industrial production. The plant shuts down.
But cattle held off the market during a holding action continue to consume
feed and grow heavier. And heavier cattle bring less per pound in the market
place after they have gone past their prime market weight.-7-
It seems apparent, in view of these factors, that COI Iective bargaining on the
Iabor model holds limited possibi litiesfor substantial enhancement of agricultural
prices or improvement of farm income for the producers of the maior commodities
produced on a national scale. This does not mean that the labor model does not
offer the prospect of substantial gains for a number of minor commodities produced
in limited geographic areas— cling peaches in California; tart cherries in
Wisconsin, Michigan and New York; and others. Collective bargaining may
also represent a usefu I device for removing inequities in the marketing system
and for inducing shifts to more efficient marketing techniques which require
close cooperation of producers and processors.
The labor model should not be regarded as the only vehicle which farmers can
use to acquire greater bargaining power in the market place. Whi Ie the NFO
and other national farm organizations have been generating headlines, a number
of enterprising cooperative leaders have been quietly encouraging a merger
movement among agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives that may meet
some of the organizational limitations of the labor model. The most ambitious
of these attempts are occurring in the dairy industry. If these plans succeed, a
new super cooperative representing dairymen throughout the entire mid-continent
area from Texas to Minnesota may actually achieve—through control of mi Ik
production, fluid milk processing, and the production of manufactured dairy pro-
ducts —the bargaining power that the cooperative movement of the 1920’s
envisaged but never achieved. If this is achieved, it will not be through market
power alone. The existence of a federal milk market order system, with a long
history of effective action through local bargaining associations and the public
enforcement of a pricing system that permits diversion of surplus production into
secondary markets, represents a maior asset that is not presently avai Iable to
producers of other maior commodities. Passage of Title II of the National Agricu~;ural
Bargaining Act would extend similar power to producers of many other commodities.
For the maior agricu Itural commodities other than ml [k— corn, wheat, soYbeans,
hogs, and beef— enhancement of bargaining power appears likely only through
the delegation of powers to limit resource use and store or divert production now
exercised by the Department of Agricu Iture in administering the maior commodity
programs. This is essentially what would be achieved by the National Agricultural
Relations Board under Title I of the proposed National Agricu itura[ Bargaining Act.
Administration of the commodity programs by the proposed National Agricu Itura I
Relutions Board wou [d, under any circumstances, be faced with the very real
consequences of rapid technical change pressing against an inelastic demand for
agricultural products. Substantial increases in prices for farmers will still be
achieved only (a) with more stringent controls over production than farmers have
thus far been willing to accept or (b) with even larger appropriations from the-8-
Federal budget than under the Agricultural Act of 1965 to induce farmer compliance
with production targets.
My analysis leads me to place greatest immediate importance on the provisions of
Titles II and Ill of the National Agricultural Bargaining Act. Title I must, by
and large, be regarded as an alternative way of administering the maior commoditY
programs. Whi Ie I see some political advantage to the changes proposed under
Title 1, I see no real economic advantages.
Passage of Titles II and Ill would widen the possibi Iity of achieving more effective
coordination of production and marketing activities in markets characterized by
effective bargaining arrangements between produce -s and handlers. This offers
the possibility of achieving gains in both equity and efficiency in the markets for
farm products.
At the same time I have some concern with respect to the potential inequities of
permitting farmer bargaining associations to impose compu Isory restraints on the
marketing of agricultural commodities on all producers in a marketing area or of
a particu Iar commodity. Care must be taken to make sure that the interests of
smaller producers are appropriately represented. On balance, however, continued
experimentation to develop more effective institutional patterns of cooperation
between producers and handlers offers the prospect of substantial gains in new
insights into the technical and social efficiency of modifications in the economic
institutions which coordinate agricultural production and marketing activities.
The achievement of greater bargaining power in the market will mntinue to leave
unsolved many of the significant problems that contribute ot the uneasiness with
which farmers view the social and economic future of rural areas. The relatively
modest price enhancement possible through greater barganing power will not prevent
nonfarm financial interests from taking advantage of a biased tax structure to acquire
greater control over farm production. It will not solve the pervasive problems of the
quality of rural education, rura i health services, and rural government. The advances
of modern agirucltural technology, modern communi cations, and modern patterns of
social organization wi II continue to represent disruptive forces in rut-a{ communities.
In my iudgment, both farm organization leadership and labor organization leadership
share a common myopia that is contributing to a deepening of the sense of frustration
in which they find themselves. The concentration of American business unionism on
wages and wage related benefits and of American commercial farm organization
leadership on prices is resu Iting in the fai lure of organized farmers and workers to
contribute effectively to the solution of the problems created as a result of the
massive social, economic, and technical changes which are causing a complete
reorganization of both urban and rural life in America.